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Service-oriented infrastructures pose new challenges in a number of areas, notably with regard to security and 
dependability. 
BT has developed a combination of innovative security solutions and governance frameworks that can address 
these challenges. They include advances in identity federation; distributed usage and access management; 
context-aware secure messaging, routing and transformation; and (security) policy governance for service-
oriented architectures. 
This paper discusses these developments and the steps being taken to validate their functionality and 
performance. 
 
IT and communication service providers and their corporate customers are increasingly introducing Service-
Oriented Architectures (SOAs) to cut costs, enhance their agility and reduce time-to-market. Service-Oriented 
Infrastructures (SOIs) amplify such benefits. In contrast to traditional infrastructures, in which resources that were 
scaled to meet peak demand were dedicated to particular applications on a permanent basis, SOIs exploit 
virtualisation to the full, allocating resources to applications in a way that constantly matches supply with demand. 
 
Simultaneously, the ways in which organisations manage their affairs are changing. Their workforces are much 
more mobile, for example, and suppliers and outsourcing partners play much bigger roles in the delivery of their 
products and services. Increasingly, organisations also want customers to be able to serve themselves, 
interacting directly with corporate IT systems to make purchases, report faults and so on. 
 
To support such new ways of doing business, organisations must make their IT systems available beyond their 
corporate networks. It isn't just a matter of allowing customers, suppliers and partners to log on and use 
whichever IT systems they need to complete their tasks. Increasingly, those who work together will also want to 
integrate their infrastructures and applications so that policies and data relevant to their relationships can flow 
securely between them in accordance with their agreements. Together, these developments pose new challenges 
in the areas of security and compliance. 
 
On the one hand, the incidence of attacks that exploit networked computing power and collaboration technology 
to gain access to corporate IT systems, steal information and cause damage has been increasing. It is reasonable 
to expect the problem to grow further as the use of distributed SOIs becomes commonplace. On the other hand, 
factors such as distributed ownership can make attacks particularly difficult to detect and address: as noted in [1], 
malicious intent is often only recognisable as an emerging property of the network. This is an issue that clearly 
needs to be addressed. 
 
Once threats have been identified, an immediate and coordinated response is essential. Changes may need to be 
made to both usage and access policies and business process parameters to mitigate the risks involved. Cross- 
and intra-enterprise compliance will be equally critical when it comes to ensuring compliance. Legal and 
regulatory frameworks are becoming more complex and less forgiving. Organisations must therefore comply not 
only with the laws and regulations that apply where they operate, but also with those that apply to their clients and 
partners. 
 
The involvement of multiple organisations creates complex relationships, especially with regard to the ownership 
of resources and information. Each of the organisations using an SOI will want to define its own policies 
governing entitlements, the usage of resources and access to them, for example. They will also want to know how 
these policies have performed at any given time – past, present or future. Unfortunately, however, their visibility of 
the processes in which they participate and their consequences may be limited. As a result, it becomes much 
harder for organisations to govern their relationships with customers, suppliers and partners in ways that are safe 
and controlled. It won't always be clear how their information and resources are used across the value chain and: 
that may make it difficult for them to identify and assess the impact of violations of their policies or agreements. 
 
The emergence of virtual organisations complicates the situation further. Such coalitions of individuals, groups, 
organisational units or even entire businesses may only exist for short periods, pooling their resources, 
capabilities and/or knowledge to pursue some shared objective. If they need new infrastructure, it must be put in 
place quickly. With little time available to negotiate details such as security and compliance procedures, those 
involved will be looking for 'out of the box' solutions that are scalable, responsive and adaptable. 
 
To address these problems, organisations will depend on interdisciplinary approaches that draw as much on 
expertise in law, economics and business management as on more obvious disciplines such as 
telecommunications and grid or 'cloud' computing. 
 
Over the past five years, BT's researchers have been working with academics and industrial partners to develop 
the solutions required1. This paper reviews the approaches they have developed and describes how they are 
being applied in the context of BT's SOI research programme. 
1.1 Overview of security capabilities 
The essence of an SOI is the delivery of ICT infrastructure (i.e., compute, storage and network) as a set of 
services. We take as our starting point the three-layer model presented in figure 1, which is introduced in [2] and 
explained in detail in [3]. Ways in which organisations can use SOIs are described in [2]. Figure 2 illustrates a 
suite of capabilities serviceoriented enterprises can use to secure their networked IT infrastructures. Those 
highlighted (in dark gray) are discussed in this paper. 
 
In section 2, we discuss the secure messaging and application gateways in figure 2. Section 3 then discusses 
federated identity management and identity brokerage, while section 4 discusses access management. In the 
case of SOIs operated by service providers like BT, the protocols customers must use and the conditions under 
which interactions with services can occur are made available to users through declarative policies and 
agreements. In the bottom layer of figure 2, a security enforcement layer is shown. This layer consists of a 
network of security enforcement points distributed across the SOI. These can be embedded in service gateways, 
message brokers and web application servers. They implement the message interceptor, message inspector, 
message broker and service proxy design patterns to allow the enforcement of actions for service endpoints 
independently of the application logic. Enforcement is based on sets of rules that can be specified as declarative 
policies that are private to a service exposure. These policies specify behaviour that focuses on non-functional 
requirements and therefore complements the business application logic, which focuses on meeting the service's 
functional requirements. 
 
The performance and monitoring of enforcement actions often depends on the support of separate infrastructure 
services, such as the ones shown in the middle layer of figure 2. The choice of the actions to be enforced, and of 
the way these are enforced, may depend on the content of the messages exchanged, their correlation pattern, the 
context of a transaction, the security claims (for example, with respect to identity, attributes and credentials) of the 
requestor and the authorisation policies in place. The middle layer of figure 2 shows value-adding 'identity 
brokerage' services that empower the enterprise to define how identity and personal information is disclosed and 
managed in different contexts, such as in different value chains and different business-to-business collaborations. 
An advanced, next-generation identity-brokerage service for business-tobusiness collaborations is presented in 
section 3 of this paper. 
 
The middle layer of figure 2 also shows value-adding services for 'usage and access control' that enable 
enterprises to manage access to their resources and the entitlements of user communities in different 
collaboration contexts. In section 4, we present an advanced authorisation service that is capable of managing 
usage and access in multi-administrative environments, such as those that appear in multi-tenancy hosting and in 
business or government coalitions. 
 
The middle layer of figure 2 also includes a security dashboard that aggregates services focusing on security 
analytics and an autonomics layer. These services correlate events (including reports of violations of security 
policy), analyse dependences, identify and report possible risks and (possibly) recommend measures to mitigate 
them, including possible reconfigurations of the security infrastructure or changes of security policy. 
 
The top layer of figure 2 refers to a governance layer that manages (a) the life-cycle of a secure exposure of 
business services, (b) the composition of such services with a collection of security capabilities that implement 
nonfunctional requirements and (c) the life-cycle of policies associated with each security capability. 
 
The detail of any changes to policy enforcement may depend on the nature of the transaction, the agreements 
that are in place and events occurring elsewhere in the infrastructure. In addition, both the enforcement logic and 
the 'semantics' of enforcement actions may have to be updated. In the latter case, changes could affect both the 
operation of the encapsulated components (that is, those performing an enforcement action) and external 
infrastructure service dependencies (that is, those associated with the enforcement of an action). 
 
Whatever updates are required will need to be coordinated across the infrastructure. Consistency between the 
'private' enforcement logic, 'public' policies and the agreements between service providers and users must be 
maintained. 
         Figure 1. The three level model for a service-oriented infrastructure 
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2. Secure messaging and application gateways 
 
Web services, which play a fundamental role in SOAs, are often based on the use of the eXtensible Markup 
Language (XML). This makes it possible for applications to interact over almost any transport protocol, including 
common web protocols such as HTTP. However, it also makes it possible for messages to carry harmful content 
past traditional security guards. For example, messages could be malformed in ways that cause parsers and 
applications to malfunction. However, many traditional network firewalls lack the ability to inspect XML messages, 
validate their structures, check them against service Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) and detect 
anomalous or suspicious content. Similarly, in typical SOA deployments, messages must pass through a 
multitude of intermediaries, each of which may require some visibility of the message and may be expected to 
perform some message processing actions. This challenges network security technologies such as Secure 
Sockets Layer (SSL), Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) that were designed 
to ensure point-to-point security and, as a result, aren't able to preserve the integrity and privacy of content as 
messages pass between message processing intermediaries and other applications on their way from one 
organisation to another. Neither can they provide messagelevel audit trails or ensure end-to-end non-repudiation.  
         Figure 2. Overview of the security capabilities required by service-oriented enterprises 
A common way of addressing such problems has been to program XML and web services security directly into 
application-based services. However, this is dependent on the availability of highly-skilled developers who 
understand emerging XML and WS-* web service security standards and know how to implement them 
effectively. Another problem is that security policies have to be implemented repeatedly on different platforms and 
maintained throughout the lifetimes of the applications involved. As well as driving up the cost of implementing 
and managing the enforcement security policy, this increases the probability that vulnerabilities will be caused by 
implementation errors and platform limitations. Such vulnerabilities can be very difficult to detect and fix once they 
have been introduced. In addition, the developers in the various organisations involved must somehow coordinate 
security policies and implementations. Web services cannot communicate security expectations or capabilities to 
clients automatically. 
 
Furthermore, if a service's security configuration needs to leverage on, or be integrated with, an existing identity 
and access management infrastructure then one-off integrations will need to be implemented independently on 
both the service and client application. Together, the complexities involved can increase development and 
maintenance costs in ways that counteract the benefits organisations expect of SOAs – for example, with regard 
to consistency, flexibility, scalability and speed of deployment. 
 
In response to the above, new classes of security infrastructure have emerged to satisfy customer demand for 
purpose-built XML and web services security in both the service provider and the client environments. XML 
firewalls and web services gateways are dedicated devices or pieces of software that can be implemented in a 
socalled demilitarised zone, data centre or an application server to enforce XML and web service security 
behaviour based on graphical, high-level declarative policies. In some cases, they also perform hardware 
accelerated data transformation, intelligent routing, SLA enforcement and general purpose SOA policy operations. 
In all cases, they allow the enforcement of message and service-level policies with little or no programming. An 
increasing number of vendors offer such solutions, including Vordel [4], Layer 7 Technologies [5], IBM [6] and 
Cisco [7]. Such solutions are used by companies like BT to protect their service delivery platforms. 
 
In cross-enterprise application integration scenarios, such as those common to SOI deployments [2] there is a 
further requirement to automate security on the client application. This is particularly important when the service 
imposes a policy that requires the protection of certain data elements in requests, the reconciliation of identity 
silos, assurance of non-repudiation or the propagation of security policy changes. While this can be done 
manually, the complexity of such operations and the likelihood that human errors will result in incompatibilities or 
weaknesses at security borders that could disrupt business operations and create substantial risks for 
enterprises. To mitigate them, SOA and service-oriented network security vendors such as Layer 7 Technologies 
offer client-side solutions (often called XML VPN) that complement their XML firewall and web services gateway 
products. 
2.1.1 Limitations of current solutions 
Although emerging XML firewall, web service gateway and VPN solutions address many of the SOA security 
challenges, they also present substantial limitations. Ironically, one of them is interoperability. Although XML 
security enforcement policies compose assertions that refer to the enforcement of widely agreed open standards, 
there is no agreed security enforcement policy standard for these solutions. Furthermore, those XML VPN 
solutions available integrate only with the XML firewalls or gateways offered by the same vendor. This increases 
an operator's dependency on solutions from a single vendor and limits interoperability between products. 
 
In addition, the structure of the proprietary enforcement-policy languages offered by such products is often biased 
towards meta-programming of XML messaging services. Furthermore, the complexity of policies increases 
substantially when vendor products are integrated with external, possibly third party, policy decision points (PDP) 
and other value-adding services. And many of the products available are biased towards service proxy and 
gateway patterns: they tend to associate policies with service endpoints. This increases the complexity of 
administration and leads to non-intuitive enforcement policies, especially when security polices are used to control 
outgoing traffic such as requests to external services, where the choice of policy to apply depends on contextual 
factors such as location, transaction or the identity and security attributes of the requester. 
 
Compounding these problems, commercial products are difficult to integrate with external SOA governance 
frameworks for policy and service assembly life-cycle management. They offer limited support for use in 
multiadministrative environments where policies for hosted services may be issued by different actors in the value 
chain. In the rest of section 2, we describe the functionality and architecture of a prototype secure messaging 
capability that is being developed by the authors in collaboration with some of the vendors mentioned above and 
attempts to address many of these limitations while preserving the benefits of current solutions. 
2.2 Requirements for a policy enforcement capability 
The requirements described here were elicited by the authors by studying the business and technological 
requirements of a large number of business cases [2], the pilot developments undertaken by research projects 
such as TrustCoM [8,9] and BEinGRID [10,11] and by working with SOA vendors such as IBM, Layer 7 
Technologies, Microsoft and Vordel. While the requirements focus on key areas of distributed systems such as 
their granularity, adaptability, interoperability and scalability, they also address value-adding capabilities such as 
integration, decentralisation and automation. 
The requirements we identified were: 
 
- Seamless integration – the enforcement of security policies across distributed transactions and the seamless 
integration with external decision points and other value-adding services. 
- Decentralisation – logically central policy management over a distributed policy enforcement infrastructure 
where the choice of the policy depends on message content and contextual information and where different 
aspects of a policy may be enforced by different enforcement points in the network. 
- Granularity – separating concerns between the specification of the enforcement logic, the use of external policy 
decision points and other value-added services and the way that policy actions are enacted. - Adaptability – so 
that both the enforcement logic and the logic of each enforcement action can be updated at run-time 
- Interoperability – translating internal enforcement logic into security and access requirements that clients 
should enforce, communicating security and access requirements to trusted clients and ensuring consistency 
between the internal enforcement logic and what is advertised or agreed. 
- Automation – supporting autonomic adaptation. 
- Scalability – coordinating a large collection of distributed enforcement points in order to secure service 
interactions in large-scale service oriented networks. 
2.3 Anatomy of a policy enforcement capability 
The authors have developed a policy-enforcement and secure-messaging capability prototype that meets the 
requirements described above. This prototype was initially developed in the context of the TrustCoM project [12] 
and is currently being extended through interactions with vendors such as Vordel and Layer 7 Technologies. The 
results are being validated within the scope of BEinGRID [10,13,14]. 
2.3.1 SOI-PEP architecture: overview 
A policy enforcement point (PEP) aims to deliver adaptive, extendable policy-based message-level enforcement. 
The basic elements that underpin our PEP architecture for SOA policies are summarised in figure 3. 
 
- Enforcement middleware – a network of service mediation and message processing nodes that intercepts 
each message targeted at, or originating from, a network resource or a network service endpoint. This is where 
service interactions are processed and service-level security policy decisions are enforced. This piece of 
middleware dynamically deploys a collection of message interceptors in a chain (interceptor chain) through which 
the message is processed prior to transmission. 
- A policy framework consisting of interrelated configuration policies. The configuration policies constrain the 
type, execution conditions and order of the actions enforced on the intercepted message by the selected 
interceptors. The configuration policies also define which external infrastructure services can be invoked by an 
interceptor and the conditions of such an invocation. 
- A messaging process model that enables selecting the appropriate configuration policies and loading and 
configuring at runtime the processing units that implement the enforcement actions described in the selected 
configuration policies. To achieve this, the processing model combines information from multiple sources 
including: (a) interdependent configuration policies, (b) an analysis of the structure and content of the intercepted 
message, (c) the current state or the history of policy enforcement and (d) contextual information that may come 
from the transport protocol, the content of the intercepted message or that may have to be collected by invoking 
external network services. An interesting feature of this processing model is that it can explore both static (pre-
defined) and dynamic (emergent during processing) interdependences between configuration policies and 
implement them by creating multiple instances of interdependent processes that implement associated 
enforcement policies within the scope of executing an initial security policy. 
- A management framework that describes the interfaces exposed by the enforcement middleware to 
management agents and specifies how the management agents may interact with the system. 
 
        Figure 3. Enforcement framework overview 
2.3.2 SOI-PEP architecture: enforcement policy framework 
The enforcement middleware policy framework includes four types of policy, as shown in figure 4. The 
Enforcement Configuration Policies (ECPs) specify the enforcement state, the actions that are to be enacted, the 
conditions under which each action is executed, the parameters for each action and the sequencing of the 
actions. Once the relevant enforcement actions, the configuration parameters and the order in which they will 
form the chain have been identified, the Interceptor Reference Policy (IRP) is loaded and inspected in order to 
determine the references to the interceptor implementing each enforcement action. This policy maps available 
enforcement actions to the computational entities that execute them. 
 
If the target executing an enforcement action requires the invocation of an external value-adding service (e.g., an 
external policy decision point), the IRP contains a reference identifying the external service and the Utility Service 
Policy (USP) used to resolve these references to the corresponding service endpoints and apply the appropriate 
ECP for invoking such services. If the enforcement policy dictates the use of an external value-adding service, the 
reference to the appropriate USP is dictated from within the relevant ECP. 
 
While processing the message, some of the interceptors may require use of the capabilities of some external 
services. For example, en-/de-cryption and signature validation may require access to a key store that is external 
to the interceptor. Security token insertion may also require invocation of an external Security Token Service 
(STS)2 that issues such a token. Similarly, security token validation may require invocation of an external STS that 
validates the given token. Access control enforcement may require invocation of an authorisation service that 
performs the access control decision. 
 
All information regarding the alternative services available and the locations of these services are contained in the 
USP. This policy contains information that enables the invocation of external infrastructure services. The 
Capability Exposure Policy (CEP) type is used to publish additional conditions for interacting with a protected 
resource. 
These policy types share a common meta-model that describes: 
 
- a common endpoint reference representation for remote services or resources; 
- common enforcement action types that are used in ECP and IRP; and 
- common USP 'static' references that serve as rigid local identifiers of respective auxiliary infrastructure services 
that may need to be invoked. 
 
        Figure 4. Separation of concerns using policies 
SOI-PEP aggregation 
To improve performance or for organisational reasons, it may be necessary to execute a policy across multiple 
enforcement points. Typical aggregation patterns include: 
 
- Cluster: In a clustered architecture, a group of enforcement points are linked together through a master node 
(i.e. main enforcement point). This master node is responsible for deciding which node treats an enforcement 
action or a set of actions. This decision can be based on the workload of the node or the logical link(s) between 
different actions. In addition, the master node is accountable for keeping track of the state of the different nodes 
as well as currently undertaken enforcement actions. 
- In-line: In an in-line aggregation of enforcement points, each point in the line resolves a particular part of the 
enforcement policy. Depending on the network topology, an in-line aggregation will bring together enforcement 
points deployed at the perimeter of the enterprise, the perimeter of internal administrative domains and the 
application deployment environment. 
Enforcement point management 
The management of the enforcement middleware is decoupled from the enforcement point itself. The overall 
management framework of the enforcement middleware includes enforcement point instances' life-cycle 
management – that is, the management of the logical association between the enforcement middleware and the 
current enforcement configuration, enforcement middleware configuration and management-specific notifications 
distribution. 
 
The enforcement point management life cycle starts with the creation of the enforcement instance. This will be 
updated when relevant before finally being destroyed when it is no longer needed. 
 
The enforcement point, which itself is virtualised as a manageable service at the control plane, exposes dedicated 
management interfaces to administrators and management services. These interfaces allow for policy 
management actions on an enforcement point such as load, activate, deactivate, destroy and roll-back to a 
previous successful configuration state. 
2.3.3 Benefits of the solution 
The core innovation underpinning this capability is a policybased, adaptive service-integration and secure-
message processing layer. This layer builds on a dynamicallyconfigurable message bus is based on the best-of-
breed architectures used in application firewalls, service gateways and event and service bus designs. 
Another innovation is the policy-based framework that enforces security policies, performs actions that entail 
security policy enforcement and manages state and process isolation. Other innovations that differentiate the new 
solution from those currently available in the market include: 
 
- the separation of concerns at policy specification, especially with respect to: 
o policies implementing the core actions to protect a service 
o policies that secure links with external policy decision points and other value-adding 'cloud' services (such as 
BT's 21CN services) 
o policies informing service consumers of the security requirements; 
- the distribution of policy actions to multiple enforcement points in a network; 
- the runtime adaptation whereby security actions are loaded and configured dynamically, allowing the execution 
of security policies to adapt based on realtime information; 
- the dynamic binding of security policies, binding the enforcement of a security policy with the policy at runtime; 
and 
- the automatic consumer policy derivation, so that service consumers no longer have to guess what policy to 
apply to invoke a protected service or to develop code to implement it. 
 
The derivation of the published CEP from the private ECP allows for an automatic derivation of security policy that 
service consumers have to comply with and eases the propagation of policy updates between integrated services, 
while maintaining secrecy of the enforcement process detail on the provider's side. 
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 The term Security Token Service (STS) is generally used to refer to a component that can issue, validate and/or exchange security tokens and correlate internal authentication mechanisms with standards-based security assertions about a subject. 
3. Federated identity management capability 
 
The need for federated identity management (FIM) originates from the requirement to allow individuals to use the 
same personal identification to authenticate and obtain a digital identity from the networks of more than one 
enterprise before they can conduct transactions. Whereas FIM entails managing identities across security 
domains, secure federation has wider objectives and a stronger focus on infrastructure. To that extent, secure 
federation can be perceived as a foundation for FIM solutions that provide the interoperable service interfaces 
and protocols enterprises use to issue, sign, validate and exchange security tokens encapsulating claims that 
may include, but are not restricted to, identity and authentication-related security attributes. 
 
A trust realm is an administered security space in which the source and target of a request can determine and 
agree whether particular sets of credentials provided by a source satisfy the relevant security policies of the 
target. If this has been established as part of the agreement, the target may defer the trust decision to a third 
party, thereby including that party in the trust realm. 
 A federation can be understood as a collection of trust realms that have established a certain degree of trust. The 
level of trust between them may vary3. 
 
Message exchanges between entities in a trust realm are typically supported by services that perform the 
following actions: 
 
- the issue, validation and exchange of security-related information such as security tokens, security assertions, 
credentials and security attributes; 
- the correlation and transformation of such securityrelated information; and 
- the determination of the basis of policies that use such security information to determine an entity's entitlements 
for a given context and the mapping of internal authentication mechanisms to commonly agreed security 
attributes. 
3.1 Requirements for a next-generation identity brokerage capability 
In this section, we describe requirements of an identity brokerage capability for SOI that we have elicited by 
studying the business and technological requirements of business cases studies, research pilots, customers and 
SOA security vendors. 
 
The capability should offer a framework supporting the complete life-cycle of 'constrained federations'4 including: 
 
- tools to manage the circle of trust that underpins an identity federation; 
- tools to support 'identity bridging' between intra- and inter- enterprise identity technology, claims and 
authentication techniques; and 
- tools to manage the full life-cycle of identities and security / access claims (provision, validation, revocation). 
 
Trust relationships between identity brokers should be adjustable to meet the dynamics of a value chain. For 
example, it should be possible to correlate trust relationships between identity brokers that have supplier and/or 
provider links in the corresponding value chain. 
 
The identity brokerage capability should separate concerns between the identity of the customer organisation that 
is using the identity broker for some collaboration, the sources of internal identities and the security administrator 
appointed by the customer for the selected collaboration. It should also enable each organisation to manage how 
security attributes and identities are assigned to their own resources in different collaboration contexts. However, 
the assignment of virtual identities cannot be repudiated and the provisioning of virtual identities and associated 
security information (such as temporary or derived cryptographic keys) should enable accountability across 
identity federations and throughout the value chain. 
 
In addition, the identity brokerage capability should give management control over the selection of the schemes 
used for bridging internal and federated identities as well as the type and structure of information that may be 
conveyed within security tokens. It should also empower security managers to choose the right balance between 
security and privacy for their needs. It should enable them to select the degree of anonymity, the mixture of 
identity-, role- or attribute-based access and the strength of non-disputable accountability of actions (e.g., end-to-
end non-repudiation) they want to apply on identity brokerage in a given identity federation context. 
 
An identity brokerage capability should be able to combine security attributes from multiple sources into 
standards-based security tokens (e.g., those specified in the Security Assertion Markup Language, SAML). It 
should be able to jointly apply recognition of authority policies, information disclosure policies and attribute 
transformation schemes in order to determine which security attributes have to be included in an identity token 
that is issued as a virtual identity for a subject within a scope of a given identity federation context. 
 
Different security tokens may be issued or be validated depending on several contextual parameters including the 
issuing authority, the identity federation context within the scope of which the security token has been issued, the 
subject possessing the security token, policies that control information disclosure and the actions and targets for 
which a security token may be legitimately used by the subject possessing this token. 
 
To facilitate integration with enterprise business processes, it should be possible to manage the identity 
brokerage capability remotely over a network through programmatic management interfaces and to expose it as a 
network-hosted (e.g., 'cloud') service that customers can integrate into their enterprise IT infrastructure. 
3.2 Anatomy of a next-generation identity brokerage capability 
An identity brokerage capability, code-named SOI-STS, has been developed that meets these requirements. The 
prototype was initially developed in collaboration with an innovation team from Microsoft in the context of the 
TrustCoM project. It has since been extended within the scope of BEinGRID, where it is being validated by 
customers in several business pilots and in market sectors [11]. 
3.2.1 SOI-STS architecture: external interfaces 
The SOI-STS is exposed as a web service with two interfaces. Its projection on the data pane exposes an 
operational interface that complies with the WS-Trust standard. Its projection on the control pane is exposed 
through a standard web services management interface. 
3.2.3 SOI-STS architecture: operational model 
From an operational perspective, the SOI-STS architecture consists principally of the components listed in table 
1. When clients request a STS to issue validate tokens, the STS will determine whether this can be done based 
on the information it holds in its database. If no federation context matches the request, a fault message will be 
returned to the requestor. Each federation context has an associated federation selector – a mechanism that 
maps a WS-Trust message or a management operation to an SOI-STS configuration. In a simple case, the 
federation selector could contain a unique identifier such as a Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) [16] or a 
collection of WS-federation meta-data [18]. 
STS database 
(repository) 
A database that includes configurations of SOI-STS instances 
for each federation context. 
Federation 
module 
A module associated with each (class of) federation context, 
consisting of a federation selector and delegation constraints. 
Federation A capability of the SOI-STS that maintains local state describing 
partner provider the trust relationships of the STS in each federation context 
known to the STS. It also allows the other STS components and 
processes to retrieve information about a circle-of-trust that is 
identified by a unique 'federation identifier'. This information will 
typically include security information to identify the STS of each 
trusted federation partner and be able to validate identities 
issued by this STS. It may also include information indicating the 
level of trust in this federation partner and potential constraints 
on how to process information provided by or disclosed to this 
federation partner. 
Claims provider 
A capability of the SOI-STS that provides a set of claims for a 
given 'internal' identity. It may also maintain a catalogue of 
internal identity providers and information about their 
association with the STS. This capability will typically be used 
during a token issuance process. It may also apply potential 
constraints about a federation context and/or an 'internal' 
identity. 
Claims validity 
provider 
A capability of the SOI-STS that maintains associations between 
federation contexts, security token types and policies that 
determine the validity of security claims. 
Claims 
transformation 
provider 
A supplementary service that applies a rules-based 
transformation between taxonomies of 'internal' and 'external' 
security attributes. 
Authentication 
scheme selector 
An auxiliary service that selects the mechanism used to 
authenticate an entity requesting the issuance of a token and 
generate the associated 'proof-of-possession' information. 
Service access 
provider 
A possible extension to the claims validation provider service 
that allows integration with, or incorporation of, the functionality 
of an authorisation service. 
Obligation policy 
provider 
An auxiliary service that can provide 'obligation policies' that 
offer, for example, associated policy enforcement points and 
instructions about further actions to be performed in order to 
complete a token issuance. 
STS business 
logic 
This defines a process that uses the internal component 
services mentioned above and is executed in order to issue, 
validate or exchange a token in response to a well-formed 
request. 
Table 1. SOI-STS architecture main components 
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 Constraint federations are federations of trust realms where trust relationships between the federating parties may vary depending on a set of constraints about recognition of authority. 
After selecting the matching federation 
configuration, an STS will instantiate the STS business logic provider and load it with the applicable process 
description. It will also instantiate the internal capabilities of the STS such as the federation partner provider, the 
claims provider and the claims validity provider and bind them to the STS business logic process. Each of these 
capabilities of the STS may have a federation-context-specific configuration, which will be loaded upon 
instantiation. 
3.2.4 SOI-STS architecture: management model 
To manage a set of dynamically instantiated services as pluggable modules, the SOI-STS management interface 
is split into two parts: a set of 'core' management methods and a single 'manage' action that dispatches 
management requests to dynamically selected modules. The signature of the 'manage' method depends on the 
modules integrated in a given instance of the SOI-STS. The flexibility of XML and SOA web services technology 
accommodates this form of dynamic composition. 
 
Referring to figure 5, the core management methods include operations for creating new federation configurations 
from given specifications, for temporarily disabling or enabling them and for inspecting their values and meta-
data. A proxy function forwards provider-specific management requests to the respective provider management 
module. 
 
        Figure 5. Management model 
3.2.5 Benefits of the solution 
Identity brokerage capability is best understood as an environment that allows the assembly and runtime 
provisioning of identity broker instances that adapt their trust models and processes based on the context within 
which brokerage is required. 
The design of the identity brokerage capability balances agility and extensibility with ease of integration and 
compliance to standards: 
 
- Ease-of-integration: The core operational and management interfaces are static and implement widely accepted 
standards; 
- Agility: The solution enables the definition of contextspecific identity brokerage processes and policies about 
how information is managed in a context. Once an identity brokerage request is received, these processes and 
policies are bound together into a context-specific identity broker execution thread that is provisioned at runtime. 
- Extensibility: The solution enables the introduction of new modules, such as the integration of 21CN and other 
'cloud' services into the identity broker definition environment. 
 
This capability is well suited for Identity-as-a-Service (IaaS) propositions. It enables the context-based 
virtualisation of identity brokerage services and supports their remote management and federation. 
trust network that can reflect the service-consumer relationships for a particular value network and a particular 
context. Brokers can share the same federation context identifier (i.e., a shared state reference) and associate it 
with their internal view of the circle-of-trust that reflects their own trust relationships (i.e., local state). The latter 
may include assertions recognising the authority of those identity brokers they trust in this federation context. 
Directed binary trust relationships can be defined between an identity broker and each of the trusted identity 
brokers with which it is associated in a federation context. This model can be further extended by including a 
representation of trust metrics such as those proposed in [19] (see also [20]). Depending on the distribution of 
recognition-of-authority statements, trust relationships in such trust networks may be adjusted to reflect the value 
chain of the corresponding business-to-business collaboration. For example if IB1 is a prime contractor 
recognising the authority of subcontractors IB2 and IB3 in federation context F1 and each of IB2 and IB3 
recognise only the authority of prime contract IB1 in F1 then IB1 will be able to process the validity of tokens 
issued by any of IB1, IB2, IB3, while either of IB2 and IB3 will be able to process the validity of tokens issued by 
IB1 and itself only. This is summarised in figure 6. 
 
        Figure 6. Example of an asymmetric circle of trust 
The identity token issuance and validation are contextualised: different virtual identities and entitlements can be 
issued for the same internal identity, depending on the context of the issuance request and different validation 
results can be obtained for the same token depending on the context of the validation request. 
Role-based RBAC is an authorisation mechanism that associates a set of 
access control 
(RBAC) 
access privileges with a particular role, often corresponding to a 
job function (e.g., finance director, student). It simplifies security 
management by providing a role hierarchy structure whereby one 
role can inherit rights from another and thus avoid repeating the 
specification of permissions. More recent development in RBAC 
has seen the introduction of constraints to restrict the assignment 
of users or permissions to roles or the activation of roles in 
sessions. 
Attribute-
based access 
control 
(ABAC) 
ABAC provides a mechanism for defining permissions based on 
just about any security-relevant characteristics, known as 
attributes. A subject's (e.g., a user's or an application's) access 
profile is defined through a combination of the following attribute 
types: 
 
- Subject attributes defining the identity and characteristics of a 
subject 
- Resource attributes associated with a web service, system 
function or data 
- Action attributes associated with a resource's possible actions, 
they can restrict what action can be invoked on the desired 
resource 
- Environment attributes describing the operational, technical or 
situational environment or context in which the information access 
occurs. 
 
ABAC policy rules can be custom-defined with consideration for 
semantic context and are significantly more flexible than RBAC for 
fine-grained alterations or adjustments to a subject's access profile. 
Policy-based 
access control 
(PBAC) 
PBAC introduces the notion of a policy authority, which serves as 
the access decision point for the environment in question. PBAC 
leverages the granular policy rule functions inherent to ABAC. 
Table 2. Main authorisation mechanism styles 
The identity brokerage capability architecture balances extensibility and compliance to standards: the core 
operational and management interfaces implement widely accepted standards, while extensibility is facilitated by 
enabling the introduction of new modules implementing mission-specific identity and security management 
models. 
4. Service-level access management capability 
 
Distributed access control and authorisation services allow groups of service-level access policies to be enforced 
in a multi-administrative environment while ensuring regulatory compliance, accountability and auditability. Until 
recently most of the research into access control for networks, services, applications and databases was focused 
on a single administrative domain and the hierarchical domain structures typical of traditional monolithic 
enterprises. A brief summary of the outputs of this research is presented in table 2. 
 
The dynamic nature and level of distribution of the business models that are created from an SOI [2] often mean 
that one cannot rely on a set of known users (or fixed organisational structures) with access to only a set of 
known systems. Furthermore, access control policies need to take account of the operational context such as 
transactions (for example, as identified in specific WS-A message IDs) and threat levels. The complexity and 
dynamic and multi-administrative nature of an SOI necessitate a rethink of traditional models for access control 
and the development of new models that cater for these characteristics of the infrastructure while combining the 
best features from RBAC, ABAC and PBAC. 
4.1 Requirements for an access management capability for SOI 
As with policy enforcement and identity brokerage, requirements were identified by studying the business and 
technological requirements of a large number of business case studies, research pilots created by projects such 
as TrustCoM [8,9] and BEinGRID [11], by working together with customers [21] and through interactions with SOA 
vendors such as Axiomatics, IBM, Microsoft and SAP. 
 
The access management capability should enable the necessary decision making for enforcing groups of service-
level access policies in a multi-administrative environment while ensuring regulatory compliance, accountability 
and security auditing. It should be able to recognise multiple administrative authorities, admit and combine 
policies issued by these authorities, establish their authenticity and integrity and ensure accountability of policy 
authoring, including the nonrepudiation of policy issuance. The validity of the access policies issued may be time-
limited and must be historically attested. 
The access management capability should also cater for policies addressing complementary concerns 
(operational and management) in a multi-administrative environment. It should support policies about:  
 
- Subjects accessing resources in a context, where policies will be issued (and signed) by administrators 
authorised to manage resources. 
- Who can delegate which access rights about which resources and in what context. 
- Obligations that instruct associated policy enforcement points. An advantage of using a policy-based 
enforcement point is that obligations may include references to CEP assertions, thereby providing semantically-
clear instructions to the enforcement point. 
- Administrative delegation, which defines who can author access policies and constraining the applicability of 
policies authored by administrative authorities. Constraints may take the form of rules that apply on a subset of 
the available attribute types and policy evaluation algorithms. 
In all cases, there may not be any prior knowledge of the specific characteristics of subjects, actions, resources 
and so on. Hence, there are no inherent implicit assumptions about pre-existing organisational structures or 
resource or attribute assignment. This comes in contrast to access control lists and traditional role-based access 
control frameworks. During access policy evaluation, access decisions may need to consider environmental 
attributes and other contextual information in addition to subject, resource and action attributes. Policy 
administration and decision making may also be contextualised. Different administration and/or command 
structures may manage independent life-cycle models and policy groups associated with different contexts. 
Access policies may also need to be executed within the scope of a particular context that influences the way in 
which their evaluation algorithms are being applied. In some cases, it may also be necessary to ensure 
segregation of policy execution – that is, that there is no interference between the policies being executed in 
different contexts. 
The policy decision point (PDP) at the core of the access management capability may be exposed as a hosted 
service, be deployed as a component of a policy decision making capability with a larger scope (such as a 
federated identity and access management capability) or be an integral part of the policy enforcement (PEP) 
function. It should also be possible to deploy the overall access management capability as a managed service, if 
needed. 
4.2 Anatomy of an access management capability 
A prototype identity brokerage capability called SOI-AuthZPDP has been developed that meets the requirements 
described above. It was initially developed in collaboration with a research team from the Swedish Institute of 
Computer Science (SICS) in the context of the TrustCoM project and has been extended within the scope of 
BEinGRID, where it has been validated in business pilots involving market sectors from media and entertainment 
to engineering and e-health. Ongoing improvements are being developed in collaboration with a spin-off from the 
SICS's Security, Policy and Trust (SPOT) laboratory and Axiomatics [22], which aims to commercialise the 
prototype. 
4.2.1 SOI-AuthZ-PDP architecture: external interfaces SOI-AuthZ-PDP exposes three interfaces: 
 
- An administration interface, called the Policy Administration Point (PAP), which is typically exposed as a web 
service complying with service management standards and accepting policies in standardised accesscontrol 
languages such as the current XACML standard [23,24]. The management interactions are detailed later in this 
section. 
- An attribute retrieval interface that joins together adaptors to external attribute authorities. - An operational 
interface. Depending on the form of deployment this can be a web service implementing standard access control 
queries such as the XACML request profiles that have standardised bindings over the Simple Object Access 
Protocol (SOAP) and a SAML profile [25]. The operational interactions are detailed later in this section. 
4.2.2 SOI-AuthZ-PDP architecture: data structures 
The core elements of the information model include the policy issuer, the policy target, the policies and the policy 
decision request and response. 
The policy issuer is an identifiable entity that has the authority to provision access policies (including 
entitlements). The policy issuer may have certain entitlements about the kind of policy targets and policies that it 
can author and all policies issued should be signed by the corresponding policy issuer. The policy target is the 
collection of variables on which a policy would apply. In the case of access management policies, these may 
include attributes identifying some subjects, resources and actions on resources. Environmental variables such as 
time, transaction context and so on may also be taken into consideration. 
Policies are collections of rules and constraints that apply on one or more policy targets. In the case of access 
management, policies will typically be about what kind of actions some identifiable subjects can make on some 
identifiable resources within a scope that is characterised by some environmental variables. Policies are 
combined in policy groups by means of policy combination algorithms that serve to resolve conflicts by prioritising 
and overriding among policies that apply on overlapping policy targets. The policies that underpin the prototype 
access management capability fall in three categories: root policies, delegated policies and administrative 
policies. These are used together in a process of validating constrained delegation of administrative authority in 
multiadministrative environments. 
 Constrained delegation validation is a process that involves looking for root policies which authorise the delegated 
policies in accordance to the constraints defined in the administrative policies. 
 
Root policies are signed policies or policy sets. They are stored in a different compartment of the policy store than 
the delegated policies. When SOI-AuthZ-PDP loads a root policy, it will not generate a policy issuer, which must 
be among a collection of pre-configured trusted authorities that are established without delegation validation. The 
root policies are used to verify the authority of signed delegated policies. 
Delegated policies are signed digitally by the administrative authority that issues them – that is, by the 
corresponding policy issuer. They are stored in a special compartment of the policy store. When SOI-AuthZ-PDP 
loads a delegated policy, it will use the digital signature to establish the policy's authenticity and generate a policy 
issuer description and associated validity constraints. The policy issuer will result in the PDP performing 
constrained delegation validation on the policy before it is used. Administrative policies define the constraints that 
inform the administrative delegation. 
 
Normative policy administration should happen through signed policies. The root policies define the authority of 
normative policy administration. 
 
In our research prototype, the SOI-AuthZ-PDP responds to an XACML access request by locating a group of 
XACML policies that apply to that request. Delegated policies are validated according to the XACML 3.0 
administrative delegation model before they are used. Administrative policies define the constraints that inform 
the administrative delegation. The validation involves looking for root policies which authorise the delegated 
policies in accordance to the constraints defined in the administrative policies. The root policies and the delegated 
policies are grouped together into an XACML policy set by applying policy combination algorithms that resolve 
conflicts by overriding behaviour [26]. 
 
'Overriding' means that policies in a policy group are classified and prioritised and they are all jointly applied on a 
given target. Decisions of higher priority policies override the lower priority policies whenever there is an overlap 
between policies in a group within the scope of the given target. Overriding is localised on the overlapping area. 
All policies in the policy group apply equally outside of the overlapping area. 
         Figure 7. An example of access request and policy combination 
An example of a policy request and an applicable policy set is shown in figure 7. Additional administrative 
delegation constraints may be used to scope the evaluation of the policy-set. 
4.2.3 SOI-AuthZ-PDP architecture: operational model 
From an operational perspective, the SOI-AuthZ-PDP architecture is as shown in figure 8. A requester (e.g., the 
end user in the figure) uses an application that contains or is deployed in a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). The 
PEP will intercept any attempted use of the application and generate an XACML request that describes the 
attempted access in terms of attributes of the subject, resource, action and environment. The request is sent to 
the PDP. The PDP will process the request and send back an XACML response with a permit, not applicable or 
deny decision, or a decision indicating an error condition and (optionally) obligations. The PEP will enforce the 
decision and let the subject access the resource or block the access depending on the decision. The PEP will 
also enforce any obligations contained in the response. The query pre-processor indexes the XACML query into a 
form which is efficient to process and generates individual queries in case the incoming request concerns multiple 
resources. The query pre-processor may also optimise multiple resource requests by invoking partial evaluation 
of XACML policies. 
 
The XACML evaluator evaluates the query using the XACML function modules. The XACML evaluator may 
retrieve additional external attributes which were not present in the incoming XACML request. 
 
The loaded policies are indexed in an efficient form in live memory, where the query pre-processor and the 
XACML evaluator will retrieve the policy form for evaluation. Attributes could be stored locally or be obtained 
during policy evaluation from an external repository (LDAP directories for instance). 
 
When the PDP receives an XACML request, the query pre-processor will parse, validate and index the request for 
processing. The query pre-processor will get the current policy of the PDP and optionally optimise the request by 
calculating an optimised policy. The policy is then evaluated and a decision sent back to the PEP. During 
evaluation, PDPs can retrieve additional attributes from external sources. 
4.2.4 SOI-PDP architecture: management model 
From a management perspective, the SOI-AuthZ-PDP architecture consists of the following main components: 
 
- A service acting as the Policy Administration Point (PAP). This is the entry point for policy administration and 
service management. A policy administrator uses the PAP (by a GUI client or programmatically) to administer the 
policies in the policy store. Access to the policy store is done through a PAP service which enforces invariants 
and access control on the policy repository. The PAP service will also perform access control on the policy store 
and will make the required changes in the store. The PAP service will consider administration of the root policies 
to be a sensitive management operation which is protected by stricter access control than administration of 
delegated policies. 
- A PAP client that offers graphical interfaces for administrators to view the policy store and its contents and 
perform common operations such as adding, removing, changing, signing and activating policies and so on. The 
client interacts with the PAP service through a web services interface and web service management protocols. 
- Attributes and policies stored locally in attribute and policy stores or in a distributed manner (using LDAP 
directories, for instance). 
- A policy loader that loads policies from the policy store. 
- A policy validator that can be used by the policy loader to validate the policies syntactically, verify the digital 
signature on the policies and, in case of delegated policies, generate the XACML policy issuer from the signature 
and amend any applicable administrative delegation constraints. 
At the time of writing, we were working with vendors to implement a range of extensions to the SOI-AuthZ-PDP 
architecture (see [23]). 
 
        Figure 8. PDP – internal functional components and external interactions 
4.2.5 Benefits of the solution 
An access management capability has been developed that combines logically-centralised policy management 
with the agility of decentralised administration of access policies and the option of distributing policy enforcement. 
Compared to other access management capabilities, its benefits become more prominent in scenarios relating to 
multi-administrative environments (e.g., business, government or defence coalitions), to shared IT and 
communications infrastructures and to multi-tenancy hosting. 
 
One of the scenarios to which the solution can be applied includes a defence coalition in which local 
administrators must act quickly using their local knowledge to define policies within the scope of constraints 
agreed by the coalition's command and control. A second class involves the sharing of resources across multiple 
organisations or organisational units that wish to keep some control over the shared resources. In the third class, 
an IT or communications provider hosts services or information owned by its customers or offers core capabilities 
that enable its customers to assemble and offer their own customised services. 
 
The innovations that differentiate the solution from other access management capabilities include: 
 
- Delegation of administrative authority: policy authoring and management is controlled by constraint-
delegation policies that put constraints on the access management policies that administrators can author and 
allow the runtime creation of dynamic chains of delegation of administrative authority without assuming prior 
knowledge of an organisation's structure. These constraints restrict the validity and scope of access management 
policies during run-time policy decision making. 
- Authenticity, integrity and accountability of access policy authoring: policy authoring rights are granted to 
issuers whose accountability is enforced by use of digital signatures, policy issuer identities and evidence 
gathering. 
- Context-based capability virtualisation: policy stores and policy-execution processes can be segregated 
based on contextual information. 
 
Additional benefits result from the use of a flexible, standards-based policy language and the versatility of 
deployment. A prototype of this capability implements XACML thus improving reuse, rapid customisation and 
interoperability. Unlike most of the currently available implementations of XACML, it leverages the concepts of 
constraint delegation and policy issuance that are being introduced in the current draft v3.0 of the OASIS 
standard. Furthermore, the core functions of the capability can be exposed as a network-hosted (a.k.a. 'cloud') 
service or deployed as a component linked into a service gateway, an enforcement layer, a service container or 
the application itself. 
5. Bringing it all together 
 
The high-level functionality of the novel security solutions developed by BT in collaboration with academic 
researchers and product vendors is summarised in table 3, while relationships to different aspects of SOI and 
policy management are shown in figure 9. 
A wide spectrum of complementary concerns is covered by the capabilities that have been developed, including: 
 
- ensuring the secure exposure and availability of services; 
- protecting the confidentiality and integrity of the information and data exchanged between these services; 
- managing service-level access in multi-administrative environments; 
- brokering and federating identities; 
- managing trust in B2B collaborations; 
- governing the distribution security policies and the composition; and 
- managing security capabilities that are deployed within the enterprise or are hosted by third parties. 
 
        Figure 9. Overview of SOA security common capabilities 
Each of these capabilities can be deployed as a web service with its own service management and policy 
administration framework (control pane) and operational interfaces (data pane). Standards-based programmatic 
interfaces facilitate integration with Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) and other third-party SOA governance tools. 
 
The capabilities can also be composed into a secure service gateway for the SOI (code-named SOI-SSG), which 
secures the exposure and end-to-end integration of business applications within the enterprise, between the 
enterprise and its customers and among business partners. SOI-SMG can offer the security subsystem of a 
service delivery platform or a service gateway ensuring that corporate applications and platforms can securely 
access specific enterprise functions over public networks. It can also be used for securely exposing value-adding 
services such as BT's 21CN common capabilities [27] or some of the reusable services at [10] to a network. 
When used in conjunction with SOAbased service integration platforms, SOI-SSG enables the seamless 
integration of value-add services into the corporate ESB. 
There are two main integration points when composing such capabilities: 
 
- A SOA security governance layer that manages the service exposure life-cycle and coordinates the PAPs of 
the security capabilities integrated in the SOI-SMG. 
- A network of PEPs that integrates the operational interfaces of the SOI security capabilities and the protected 
business services.  
Security capability Functionality 
B2B collaboration 
management 
A collection of managed services that support the full life-
cycle of defining, establishing, amending and dissolving 
collaborations bringing together a circle of trust (federation) 
of business partners. For a description of these services, 
please refer to [12] and [17]. 
Identity brokerage 
SOI-STS 
A policy-based and context-aware identity broker that 
allows the representation of federation contexts (circles of 
trusts) and can issue, validate and exchange virtual 
identities (security tokens) while (a) implementing different 
virtual identity schemes, credential mappings and 
authentication mechanisms; and (b) recognising different 
external identity authorities depending on this context. 
Identity federation 
management SOI-
FMS 
Facilitates the management of full life-cycle of circles of 
trust, by coordinating a distributed process that establishes 
trust between the participating partners. Allows the creation 
of trust relationships between STS instances that reflect the 
dynamics of supply chains. 
Usage/access 
management SOI-
AuthZ-PDP 
An authorisation service that automates usage and access 
management decision-making based on access 
management policies that can be authored by multiple 
administrators, while facilitating the composition of policies 
from different administrative authorities, with policy analysis 
to prove regulatory compliance and accountability and 
security audit of administrative actions. 
Secure service & 
messaging gateway 
SOI-SMG 
A fusion of (a) an application service firewall / gateway that 
protects interactions to XML applications and Web 
Services, (b) a proxy that intercepts, inspects, authorises 
and transforms content on outgoing requests to external 
services, (c) a message bus that enforces content- and 
context- aware message processing policies and (d) a light-
weight core of a service bus that integrates the interfaces 
exposed by all other SOI security capabilities in the data 
pane. 
Analytics (SOA 
security dashboard) 
A collection of services that correlates and analyses 
notifications representing events reported by the other 
security capabilities. It may perform complex event 
processing in order to identify and classify a security or 
reliability event based on the events reported and may also 
perform risk analysis. 
Autonomics layer 
A collection of services to reconfigure the security services 
based on declarative adaptation policies and in response to 
security or QoS events in order to optimise performance, to 
respond to threats and to assure compliance with 
agreements and enterprise policies. 
Security governance 
layer (SOA security 
governance gateway) 
A governance layer managing (a) the life-cycle of a secure 
exposure of business services, (b) the composition of such 
services with a collection of SOI security capabilities that 
implement nonfunctional requirements and (c) the life-cycle 
of policies associated with each SOI security capability in 
order to implement non-functional requirements associating 
with the exposure of a business service. 
Table 3. Summary of functionality offered by different security capabilities 
Figure 10 shows how SOI security capabilities can be composed into SOI-SMG during service operation. The 
secure Service and Messaging Gateway (SMG) intercepts messages addressed to a set of resources and 
enforces a security policy and integrates additional security capabilities (such as identity brokerage, authorisation 
services and other managed security services) to secure the resources' communications. 
 
Policies can be contextualised: depending on the context of the request, the SMG will load a certain set of these 
policies. Context may depend on meta-data such as the location of the requestor, the region of the endpoint being 
invoked, references to business transaction types in the message, state of alert, etc. 
 
In figure 11, the SOI-SMG is integrated with identity brokerage and authorisation decision points. In accordance 
with the selected policy, the SMG will request an XML token on behalf of the requestor at the client side, passing 
on the appropriate context reference to an identity brokerage capability. The identity broker will inspect the token 
issuance request and any associated context references and will select the appropriate identity providers, 
attribute transformation schemes, identity federation parameters and security token schemes. The selection 
translates internal identity, such as an X509 binary certificate or a Kerberos ticket, to a set of commonly agreed 
security assertions that are aggregated into a security token (for example, one following the SAML standard) that 
acts as a temporary virtual identity. The identity broker should also generate a proof-of-possession key – 
cryptographic material used by the SOI-SMG to ensure that the integrity and authenticity of the requests to the 
service can be proven. This token will be embedded into the outgoing request and certain message elements will 
be signed with the proof-of-possession key provided by the identity broker in order to establish the authenticity of 
the data contained in these elements and bind them to the provisioned identity. Depending on the scenario, the 
same, a derived or a different cryptographic material may be provisioned for encrypting message elements in 
order to ensure end-to-end confidentiality of data targeting specific recipients. Although providing cryptographic 
material to ensure data confidentiality is not part of the normative operation of an identity broker, the architecture 
of the STS described in section 3 facilitates such enhancements if they are needed. 
         Figure 10. SOI-SSG integration 
On the service-side, the SMG of the targeted partner performs any message processing and protection actions 
required by the policy and will also extract the XML token from the incoming message and send it for validation at 
its own local identity broker. The latter will apply the appropriate token and claims validation procedure and will 
inform the SMG whether the token is valid and if so provide the list of associated claims. 
 
The SMG can then use the claims for authorisation queries to determine whether the requestor is allowed to use 
the action specified by the incoming request on the targeted resource. Authorisation decisions may also depend 
on contextual references and other information collection from the operational environment. For every run-time 
action, the SMG can generate monitoring and audit events. In addition to security auditing, such events can be 
used by the autonomics layer of the SMG in order to optimise its configuration or respond to changes of the 
context of the interactions. The autonomics layer processes the events, correlates them and determines whether 
to produce other events (e.g., an alert or a reconfiguration notification to another SMG node) or to trigger 
reconfiguration actions by invoking a management process via the governance layer. 
 
An example of an adaptation event is the case where a targeted partner repeatedly receives requests with valid 
XML tokens, therefore ensuring the request does come from an authenticated and recognised requestor, but with 
invalid claims and attributes forcing the authorisation service into denying access to the desired resource. As a 
result the SSG will fire off an event to the adaptation engine. After a set threshold, the adaptation service can ask 
the partner that issues the XML authentication token to reconfigure its infrastructure to ensure that clients either 
have the appropriate claims in the future or be prevented from making calls altogether. 
6. Conclusion and further directions 
 
In this paper, we have provided an overview of concepts, models and technologies that can be used to secure 
operations in service-oriented enterprises. Examples from an SOI security framework developed by BT were used 
to illustrate how the concepts and technologies can be combined to achieve security in IT-driven business 
environments and illustrate the provision and control of security services in a service-oriented world. The analysis 
and results presented stem from ongoing research. A number of solutions have already been patented that 
support the realisation of SOA through a collection of context-sensitive, policy-based and service-oriented security 
capabilities, and a complementary collection of design patterns that support the composition of these capabilities 
into secure SOA blue-prints that are fine-tuned to secure business operations in different contexts. 
 
One area for further research is the improvement of policy-based management of the 'circles-of-trust' that 
underpin trust in virtual organisations or other forms of business-to-business collaboration. This capability, 
together with identity brokerage, could be offered as a networkhosted service, extending the Identity as a Service 
(IaaS) provisioning model [28]. (See also [29] for an example of a recent IaaS solution.) 
 
Another area that needs further research is the development of the secure SOA governance layer to improve the 
support it provides for assembling SOA security capabilities into secure SOA profiles within different business 
contexts and for coordinating service and policy management throughout the SOA life-cycle. 
 
We also plan to explore opportunities for innovations developed to date to be built into the SOA vendor products 
that BT and others use to ensure the security and agility both of their own operations and of those of their 
customers. Finally, further work will be done to validate the solutions developed in the different business 
application contexts typical of virtual engineering, retail, e-health and defence organisations and of service 
providers operating virtualised ICT infrastructures. 
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